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Summary
ln the early 1990s, economic growth came to a standstill in Finland. Unemploy-
ment figures surged and the rate of unemployment climbed tolB%. ln response to
these developments, government set up various committees to explore the options
available for reversing this unfavourable trend.
Several proposals for lowering pension ages temporarily have been made with the
purpose of reducing the high rate of unemployment witnessed in the 1990s. These
proposals have been publicly debated but so far they have not been carried out.
The low average effective retirement age combined with the high rate of unem-
ployment is and has been one of the major problems of Finnish social politics of
the 1990s: as many as nine in ten persons start to draw a pension before the gen-
eral retirement age. ln 1994, the unemployment rate was 187", and stilltoday it is
13-14o/o. This being the case, all the options available for lowering the unemploy-
ment rate are being explored. The aim of the suggestions, i,e. to find employment
for young people, is well worth supporting.
The pensions suggested may seem cost neutral, and they are socially acceptable,
in that they give elderly people a chance to retire and young people an opportunity
to work. Calculations, however, show that the materialisation of these suggestions
cannot be supported in financial terms. lndeed, the unemployment rate would
seem to decline, but no new jobs would be created. At best, the suggestions would
result in a change of people in already existing jobs.
The pensions proposed are incompatible with the trends in both pension and un-
employment policy. The aim of social policy is to give people an incentive to con-
tinue working and to encourage retirees and unemployed people to return to
gainful employment. However, introduction of the pension benefit suggested would
cause the actual general retirement age to fall. Furthermore, the new pension
benefit would conflict with other pension benefits.
Pension benefits were cut in 1996 in order to bring pension contributions and pen-
sion expenditure into balance both in the short term and in the long term. The aim
of pension policy is to maintain this balance. However, quite opposite to these
aims, the better the proposed pension would serue in terms of creating more em-
ployment opportunities, the more the pension contribution would increase and
disturb the balance recently reached.
Provision of eamings-related pensions is based on joint responsibility between
generations. The credibility and sustainability of the scheme requires that agree-
ments and decisions are not changed to achieve short-sighted targets that are in
contradiction with the aims of the pension policy pursued. Admittedly, unemploy-
ment continues to be a pressing problem in Finland, but it should be dealt with by
means other than pension policy.

1. lntroduction and background
ln the early 1990s, economic growth came to a standstill in Finland and the econ-
omy of this country witnessed a serious depression, with severe repercussion for
business life. Companies went bankrupt and people were made redundant. Un-
employment figures surged and the rate of unemployment climbed to 187o. ln re-
sponse to these developments, government set up various committees to explore
the options available for reversing this unfavourable trend.
Several proposals for lowering pension ages temporarily have been made with the
purpose of reducing the high rate of unemployment witnessed in the 1990s. Some
of the proposals include an obligation for the employer to provide employment to
an unemployed job-seeker for every employed person taking retirement at a tem-
porarily lower pension age, whereas other proposals include no such obligation.
The low average effective retirement age combined with the high rate of unem-
ployment is and has been one of the major problems of Finnish social politics of
the 1990s: as many as nine in ten persons start to draw a pension before the gen-
eral retirement age. ln 1993 and 1994, the unemployment rate was almost 187o,
and still today it is 13-14%. This being the case, all the options available for low-
ering the unemployment rate are being explored. The aim of the suggestions, i.e.
to find employment for young people, is well worth supporting.
Although allthe laws concerning social security are passed by parliament, Finnish
pension policy is closely integrated with the incomes policy system. The labour
market organisations have played a key role in all the important decisions on the
statutory earnings-related pension scheme. As a consequence, the Finnish pen-
sion scheme also has a long history of taking part in running the unemployment
security plan, especially when it comes to providing for the elderly unemployed. A
shofi introduction to the Finnish statutory earnings-related pension scheme follows
in Appendix 1.
The statutory earnings-related pension scheme was introduced in the early 1960s,
but in respect of pension financing the scheme will not attain maturity until the
2030s, which implies that the rate of the pension contribution is expected to in-
crease until the 2030s. The financing of the scheme is partly based on funding. On
the one hand, the rate of contribution for each year is calculated employing actu-
arial bases, but, on the other hand, the average yearly cost is negotiated by the
labour market organisations. The aim of the negotiations is to adjust the cost to an
admissible level not below the actuarial minimum level. The rate of contribution is
confirmed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. lf the level is set below the
actuarial minimum, a legislative amendment is always required. Because the con-
tribution is fixed separately for each year, it is also possible, using the existing
system, to negotiate new or temporary arrangements in the pension scheme to
solve pressing, often short-term, problems in the field of social security.
2As early as 1971, unemployment pension was introduced in the statutory earn-
ings-related pension scheme. At the time, many elderly unemployed persons
had difficulties finding employment and the period entitling to unemployment
benefit was shod, for which reason the means of living were running short for
many. To guarantee elderly unemployed people an income of more permanent
nature before retirement age, the unemployment pension was introduced. ln re-
sponse to the rise in the rate of unemployment for the elderly, especially, wit-
nessed in the late 1970s, the qualifying age for unemployment pension was
lowered f rom 60 to 58 years, and further to 55 years in 1980. The qualifying age
remained at 55 until 1986, after which it was gradually raised back to 60. At the
same time, a decision was taken to shift on responsibility for unemployed per-
sons under the age of 60 to the unemployment security plan. During the boom
years at the turn of this decade, the 1990 Pension Committee suggested aboli-
tion of the unemployment pension. This suggestion did not, however, material-
ise, mainly because the rate of unemployment had started to go up again. How-
ever, the period of unemployment benefit required to qualify for unemployment
pension was extended from 200 to 500 days.
Against this background, political decision-makers and trade union activists
could be expected to try to use the statutory earnings-related pension scheme
as a toolfor reducing the unemployment rate.
2. Suggestions
Since 1993, several proposals (including initiatives by Parliament) to lower pen-
sion ages temporarily have been made in order to reduce the rate of unem-
ployment for younger people. These proposals have been publicly debated, but
so far they have not been carried out.
Earlier it was suggested that an employee aged 55 or over could be granted a
pension of the same level as the disability pension, provided that an unem-
ployed person under age 30 was employed in his place. Later suggestions in-
clude the right of people with a working career of at least 30 years to choose to
take a pension from the age of 55 and over. Such people would receive the
pension accrued by the time of retirement (the pre-contingency period) but the
pension would not be projected to retirement age (the post-contingency period).
The earlier suggestions are referred to as shift-of-generation pensions, whereas
the later suggestions are called voluntary early retirement pensions.
The pension benefits suggested may look cost neutral. They may even be per-
ceived as generating savings for the economy as a whole. And they are also
socially acceptable, in that they give eldedy tired and exhausted persons a
chance to retire and young people an oppofiunity to work. However, the practi-
cal implementation of the suggestions may produce rather surprising effects
and have far-reaching and highly unexpected consequences for the pension
scheme. ln the following, the situation in the labour market and in the field of
social security is first presented. This presentation is followed by an analysis of
the ccnsequences of the later suggestions for the labour market, the pension
3scheme and the field of social security as a whole. Many of these conse-
quences are the same also in the case of the earlier suggestions.
3. Labour market and social security situation in Finland
High rate of unemployment especially for the elderly and the young
Still in 1990, the unemployment rate was as low as 3%. lt reached its maximum
in 1994 al 18o/o and is now slowly declining. ln '1996 the rate was 16% and in
1997 it had further dropped to 14.5o/o. The high unemployment rate, especially
among the elderly (28% ol the labour force in 1996 for age bracket 55-59), is a
serious problem, and assuming that the rate remains at this high a level, it will
come to a head within a few years when the baby-boomers born after the Sec-
ond World War will reach the age of 55. Employers may often find it easier to
give an elderly person notice, because elderly people are, in practice, guaran-
teed an income from the age of 55 onwards, either in the form of unemployment
benefit or pension benefit. Before 1997, unemployment benefit could be drawn
from the age of 53 through to the age of 60 and, thereafter, the beneficiary
would automatically qualify for unemployment pension payable until retirement
age (the unemployment pension pathway). The age limit for entry into the un-
employment pension pathway was raised from 53 to 55 at the beginning of
1997, and it may be further raised. Where payment of unemployment benefit is
no longer automatically extended until the age of 60 because of the new regula-
tions, the unemployed persons are guaranteed rehabilitation or training or of-
fered an employment contract for ten months to promote their return to gainful
employment.
The unemployment rates for young people are as high as for older people. The
suggestions would mainly concern young unemployed and elderly employed
persons. For the sake of comparison, it can be mentioned that 120,000 persons
under 30 were seeking employment in 1996, whereas 150,000 elderly over 55
were employed.
Lower participation in working life among the elderly
Not only in industrialised countries but in many countries throughout the world
labour market participation rates among elderly wage earners have declined
and are still declining. Today people leave the labour market earlier than two or
three decades ago. The set retirement ages of public pension systems around
the world are becoming less and less valid as milestones marking the dividing
line between the economically active period of labour market padicipation and
the economically inactive period of retirement (Sorensen, 1997).
ln Finland, the labour force participation rates among the elderly have changed
dramatically since the beginning of the 1960s. ln 1963, the rate among men in
age bracket 55-64 was B4o/o,20 years later it had dropped to 54% and in 1995 it
was as low as 46"/". The share of employed has decreased even more during
the past 12 years, from 51 .4"/" to 34.30/". Of the OECD countries, Finland
4ranked second to Spain in this respect, cf. Table 1.ln 1983, the ratio was al-
most 9 percentage points below the average of the OECD countries, while in
1995, in a comparison between the same countries, the share was 18 percent-
age points below the average and the lowest of all countries. Today only about
one-third of both men and women aged 55 - 64 years are still working, a devel-
opment which is mainly attributable to factors like the deep recession witnessed
at the beginning of this decade, the attitudes towards elderly in working life, and
several options for drawing a pension (cf . Appendix 1) before retirement age.
Table 1. Employed/population ratios in OECD-countries for men aged 55-64
Percentages
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Check Bepublic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
lceland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nonvay
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Average
1 983
59.6
1 995
54.1
40.8
34.5
54.0
50.6
63.2
34.3
38.4
48.8
58.9
89.6
42.3
80.8
35.1
77.9
41.1
63.0
70.0
s8.9
48.0
64.4
79.1
59.7
56.1
63.6
56.3/52.6.
Change
-5.5
47.7
66.4
-13.2
-'t2.4
63.1
51.4
50.4
57.4
68.8
0.'l
-17.1
-12.0
-8.6
-9.9
36.1
80.5
37.8
6.2
0.3
-2.7
46.1 -5.0
78.9
69.0
65.2
73.9
-8.9
-10.1
-17.2
-9.5
64.3
65.2
60.'l
-8.2
-1.6
The latter ligure represents the average of the countries in the 1983 comparison
(source: OECD Employment Outlook 1996)
5The employment situation in Finland has improved somewhat since 1995, but
still only 37"/" ol men aged 55-64 were in employment in 1996,12o/o were un-
employed and about 50o/" w€re retired. The figures are nearly the same for
women. Combined statistics for both sexes is shown in Table 2. The number of
unemployed in age bracket 60-64 is very small because of the automatic enti-
tlement to unemployment pension from the age of 60 following a period of un-
employment benefit. lf those drawing unemployment pension are considered as
unemployed, the ratio of unemployed represents around 20"/"lor the whole age
group as well as for both subgroups, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Population aged 55-64 by activity in 1996
% of population
Both sexes
Employed
Unemployed
Retirees, all
- on unemployment pension
Others
Population
Age
55-59
48.5
18.6
27.9
5.0
100
60-64
19.0
3.7
72.1
16.9
5.2
100
55-64
34.8
11.7
48.4
7.8
5.1
100
(Sources: Labour Force Survey of Statistics Finland and Statistical Yearbook of Pensioners in
Finland)
Higher expectation of life
Life expectancy at age 50 has increased by 5 to 6 years during the past 30
years, while the average effective retirement age has dropped considerably
over the same period, although the health of the elderly is improving and the
elderly people are better educated than the generation before them. This phe-
nomenon is to some extent a paradox. As a consequence, the period of retire-
ment has been drawn out at both ends, and the cost arising from the retirees
has increased much more than originally envisaged.
Trends discernible in Finnish pension policy
During the 1970s and 1980s, there seems to have been general agreement
about early retirement in many countries. Against the background of growing
unemployment and economic recession, governments and labour market or-
ganisations have a shared interest in early retirement, though based on different
motives, and individuals seem to have embraced the idea wholeheartedly (So-
rensen,1997).
6ln the 1970s and 1980s, there was constant pressure in Finland for lowering the
retirement age. During the past twenty years, the trend towards early exit from
work has been very strong. People have either retired directly from the labour
market or taken the unemployment pathway. Despite the reforms and decisions
to promote longer working careers, early exit from the labour market is still nor-
mal practice in Finland and a shift of generation at workplaces in the manner
suggested would only contribute to keeping up early exit practices. Hence, the
presentation of the trends and ideas surrounding retirement practices during the
past decades.
ln 1971, the unemployment pension was introduced for long-term unemployed
persons over the age of 60. When the employment situation deteriorated at the
end of the 1970s, the minimum qualifying age for unemployment pension was
temporarily lowered from 60 to 58 years. A couple of years later it was further
lowered to 55 years. ln the late 1970s, a pension committee was set up to pre-
pare a reform of pension ages. At the time it was feared that the excessive sup-
ply of labour would be long-standing. Until then, lowering pension ages had
been considered as a tool for dealing with unemployment. When a position be-
came vacant through someone taking early retirement, it was assumed that it
would be filled. However, this was not self-evident, as it turned out. lnstead,
measures of rationalisation were often taken and people who were fit for work
were redeployed into retirement and a reshuffle within the enterprise was or-
ganised. Hence, the pension committee also considered that lower pension
ages could not be motivated by considerations of employment policy. On the
other hand, a lower retirement age based solely on occupation was not flexible
enough, because the character of the work often changed in the long run and
sometimes the work even turned lighter. The committee therefore suggested
that, in lowering pension ages, the primary importance should be attached to
the individual effects of ageing and sickness. As a result, in the late '1980s,
flexible pension age arrangements were introduced, including three new, com-
plementary pension benefits: individual early retirement pension, early old age
pension (actuarially reduced pension) and part{ime pension (cf. Appendix 1).
Originally, the minimum qualifying age was 55 years for individual early retire-
ment pension and 60 for the other two pension benefits.
The idea behind the introduction of flexible pension ages was to allow people to
retire individually as people grow old differently. The parttime pension and the
early old age pension have not been very much used, whereas the individual
early retirement pension has become very popular. When the minimum qualify-
ing age for unemployment pension was gradually raised back to 60 in the late
'1980s, some cohorts could qualify for either individual early retirement pension
or unemployment pension before the age of 60. ln the statistics, this fact is re-
flected in an extremely high number of new pensioners. As a result, the average
effective retirement age has remained around 58-60 years for the past 10 years,
and considering the very high unemployment rate, especially among the elderly,
it is not expected to rise during the next few years. one-fifth of the population
aged 55-59 is unemployed and most of them will be entitled to unemployment
pension at the age of 60, provided they remain unemployed.
7Figure 1 shows the number of new pensions awarded in 1983-1996 to people in
age bracket 55-64. lt also illustrates a drop in the number of individual early re-
tirement pensions awarded during the past few years. This is due to the gradual
rise in the minimum qualifying age from 55 to 58, with the cohort born in 1938.
On the other hand, a boom is to be expected in 1998, when the first new cohort
in three years will qualify for individual early retirement pension.
Figure 1. New pensioners in age bracket 55-64 in the private sector
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Ever since the turn of this decade, the aim of Finnish social policy has been to
increase the labour market activity of the elderly
Since the late 1980s, the policy has been to encourage people to stay longer in
working life. This has been called for by the rapidly declining labour market ac-
tivity of the elderly and the impending shortage of labour after the turn of the
century, Special attention has been focused on maintenance of the work capac-
ity of the population of working age and on measures of rehabilitation and
training. The policy is also to encourage retired people to return to gainful em-
ployment temporarily or permanently. ln addition, partial pension benefits are
given preference over fulltime benefits.
Two large pension reforms were carried out in igg3-1996 to prevent an im-
pending dse in the pension contribution and to both encourage people to con-
tinue working and reward those who do. As an incentive to longer labour market
activity, elderly employees over 60 are rewarded by a higher accrual rate. Fur-
thermore, the annual accrual rates are reduced for early retirees and disabled
workers, a sofi of guarantee pensionable wage is applied to elderly workers
with a long employment history, and rehabilitation measures are encouraged. ln
addition, the minimum qualifying age for individual early retirement pension was
Iraised to 58, whereas the qualifying age for part-time pension was lowered from
60 to 58. ln an experiment, the qualifying age for this pension will be further re-
duced to 56 as of July 1998 and will remain reduced for two years. There is still
pressure for further changes. The reform of the unemployment security plan of
1997 was also aimed at promoting employment opportunities for the elderly.
The increase in life expectation may also, before long, warrant a rise in the
general retirement age of 65. There is general agreement among pension ex-
perts (Varoma et al 1997) that the general retirement age will be one of the key
issues in the development of the pension scheme in the near future.
Unfoftunately, the economic depression interfered with the amendments made,
and it is acknowledged that the reforms cannot be successful, unless the un-
employment rate for the elderly falls and the labour market participation of the
eldedy increases. The unemployment rate for the elderly is partly dependent on
the economic development (surviving the economic crisis), and the labour mar-
ket participation of the elderly is partly dependent on adequate measures of
early rehabilitation and better provisions of pension to those who stay at work
compared to those who take early retirement. Nevertheless, the attitude to eld-
erly employees must also change. Several national programmes to keep elderly
workers employed or to encourage their return to the labour market have been
implemented in the 1990s. A couple of years ago, in December 1995, the Fin-
nish govemment set up a committee to investigate the situation of elderly in the
labour market. The key proposal of this committee was the implementation of
the National Programme for Ageing Workers, a plan designed to improve the
employment opportunities of the elderly. This programme was launched by de-
cision of the Finnish government in February 1997. The aims of the programme
include measures to increase adult education opportunities and to implement
part{ime pension, job alternation and subsidised parttime employment
schemes for elderly employees. The prospects of making changes to pension
payments and non-work-related payments by employers will also be explored,
with the purpose of lowering the threshold to hiring elderly workers.
4. Consequences for the labour market
Encouraging as it may be to look for ways of dealing with the high rate of un-
employment, especially among the young, the suggestions for temporarily leg-
islating lower pension ages as a means of reducing unemployment totally con-
tradicts the aims of the National Programme for Ageing Workers and any other
programmes designed to promote longer working careers. The suggestions to
temporarily lower pension ages mean that the proportion of people working be-
yond 55 will further decline from the current extremely low level of one-third.
This would mean that the increase in longevity would coincide with shofter peri-
ods of active employment. From the labour market point of view, the sugges-
tions to lower pension ages temporarily would only result in seemingly lower
unemployment rates, but no new workplaces would spring up. At best, it could
only result in a change of people in already existing jobs.
9As the thought behind the suggestions is to create jobs for those who are un-
employed, the natural implication is that anyone retiring on a shift-of-generation
or voluntary early retirement pension should exit work permanently. ln the pres-
ent economic and labour market situation, a person aged 55 years could com-
mit himself to retiring from work completely. Later, if circumstances change and
the retiree wants to return to gainful employment but cannot do so, the conse-
quence may be an expanding informal economy.
The aim of the proposals is to reduce unemployment. According to a number of
national studies, the effectiveness of early retirement in combating unemploy-
ment is limited because the intended redistribution of unemployment does not
occur to a satisfactory extent. A number of national studies show that a large
proportion of the jobs vacated by workers taking early retirement are not reoc-
cupied by younger workers. Levels of re-employment vary across countries, but
are often low, and it is thus argued that this strategy seems to be of limited ef-
fectiveness. lt certainly reduces unemployment among older wage earners, but
it does not increase the employment prospects of the young (Sorensen, 1997).
ln Finland, the effect of early retirement on employment figures has not been
properly investigated. A survey (Jdidiskeldinen-Lundqvist, 1983) was however
made at the beginning of the 1980s. The suruey found that special pension ar-
rangements resulted in employment opportunities for younger unemployed per-
sons in about half the cases. ln the 1990s, the effect would be much smaller
because of the strong rate of productivity growth (Rantala, 1997). A study of
part-time pensions (Takala, 1996) supports this conclusion. Of those shifting
over to part-time pension, only 15% repoded that new people were engaged for
the part{ime jobs vacated.
The efficiency of the proposals can be examined by estimating the minimum
cost of each employed person. lt can be assumed that no more than half of the
jobs vacated by those shifting into retirement create employment opportunities
for the unemployed. Because of the higher replacement rate of unemployment
and disability pension benefits, it is assumed that the voluntary pension will
mainly attract those employees who do not expect to be eligible for either un-
employment or disability pension in the next few years. The salary payable to
the elderly in Finland represents, on average, around FIM 130,000 a year, the
social security cost of younger unemployed persons is approximately FIM
50,000 per year, and the voluntary early retirement pension represents ap-
proximately 50% of pensionable earnings. Using these assumptions, the addi-
tional cost of each employed person during the first few years would represent
around FIM 40,000 a year and the total future cost would be around FIM
140,000, which is nearly three times the approximated average yearly cost of a
young unemployed person. At this cost, there would be no new workplaces. At
best, the suggestions would result in a change of people in already existing
jobs. Thus, the materialisation of these suggestions cannot be suppofied in fi-
nancial terms.
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5. Analysis of the consequences for the pension scheme
Conflicts with the trends in both pension and unemployment policy
ln developing both unemployment and pension plans, the aim has been to give
people an incentive to continue working and to encourage retirees and unem-
ployed people to return to gainful employment. This was the target of both the
pension reforms carried out in 1993-1996 and the reform of the unemployment
security plan implemented in 1997. lntroduction of a voluntary early retirement
pension would be in conflict with these aims. lt would mean that people over 55
who are healthy and flt for work would be granted a pension, which is totally in-
compatible with the purpose of social politics, i.e. to encourage both disabled
and unemployed people to return to gainful employment by offering them reha-
bilitation and training and by making legislative amendments.
Measures that started out as temporary have proved to be long-standing
The proposals to lower the retirement age are meant to be temporary. ln prac-
tice, however, they have turned out to be long-standing. The minimum qualify-
ing age for unemployment pension was temporarily lowered seven times be-
tween 1978 and 1985. Furthermore, both the earlier low minimum qualifying
age for individual early retirement pension and the automatic extension of the
period of unemployment benefit until the age of 60 for unemployed people over
the age of 55 can be considered as consequences of the previous low minimum
qualifying age for unemployment pension. The temporary lowering of the mini-
mum qualifying ages have had adverse effects on the pension scheme and on
the whole field of social security. Such measures keep up expectations of low
pension ages and early exit from work.
ln practice, pathways out of work already exist for those over 55
Because of the poor employment situation, employees over 55 may, in practice,
avail themselves of the opportunity to exit work voluntarily, receive unemploy-
ment benefit until the age of 60 and after that be automatically entitled to unem-
ployment pension payable until the general retirement age of 65. The unem-
ployment pathway is more profitable than the voluntary early retirement pension
suggested. The earnings-related unemployment benefit for average earnings
plus or minus 20% corresponds to a pension level of approximately 50-60%,
and the unemployment pension can never be lower than the suggested pension
because the period of unemployment and the time between pension contin-
gency and the general retirement age is counted as pensionable time. Because
of the higher replacement rate of unemployment and disability pensions, the
number of people retiring on these pensions is not expected to change re-
markably. The voluntary early retirement pension suggested would, therefore,
mainly be an additional pension benefit in the wide range of already existing
pension benefits.
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The argument for counting the post-contingency period for elderly as pension-
able time should be closely examined
Disability and unemployment pensions are projected to retirement age, provided
that pension contingency occurs while the person is employed or within a year
of the termination of employment. Any periods during which the applicant has
received sickness or unemployment benefit extends this time.
The voluntary early retirement pension suggested would not be projected to re-
tirement age. At first thought, it sounds reasonable that a voluntary pension is
granted at a lower level. On closer examination, however, the pension level
suggested questions the justification in projecting unemployment pensions to
retirement age. One cannot but question the legitimacy of a scheme granting a
higher pension to those who are unemployed before occurrence of pension
contingency than to those who are granted a voluntary pension on leaving
seruice with the specific purpose of reducing the unemployment rate. Further, if,
as assumed in the proposals, the level of pension corresponding to the pension
accrued is high enough for an adequate subsistence, what arguments are there
any more for projecting any pension granted near the general retirement agelo
retirement age? Exclusion of the post-contingency period from the pensionable
time would eliminate any doubts about whether working near retirement age is
profitable or not in respect of the amount of the pension benefit. A step in this
direction was already taken in the 1996 pension reform, when the annual ac-
crual rates were reduced for early retirees (cf. Appendix 1).
The gradual implementation of the pension scheme has been presented as an
argument in favour of projecting the pension to retirement age, but in a few
years' time when the scheme attains maturity this argument will no longer be
valid. lt can be argued that if early retirement is forced rather than voluntary, the
pension should be projected to retirement age. On the other hand, the distinc-
tion between forced and voluntary early retirement similarly as that between
disabled and non-disabled wage earners narrows off near retirement age, and
under the prevailing conditions of mass unemployment the elderly wage earners
may choose whether to continue working or take the unemployment pension
pathway.
Actual general retirement age would fall
The general retirement age is 65. ln the public sector it was earlier 63 years
and still is for elderly civil servants.
Statutory earnings-related pension accrues in age bracket 23-64. As a rule,
pension accrues at an annual rate of 1.5"/" of pensionable earnings. However,
for those over 60, the annual accrual rates were raised from 1.5 to 2.5 in the
1994 pension reform. The target, or maximum amount, of the pension repre-
sents 60% of the wage and it used to accrue in 40 years. Because of the higher
accrual rates introduced for the elderly, the maximurn pension may today al-
ready accrue in 36-37 years. ln the public sector, the target of the earnings-
related pension earlier represented 66% of the wage and it accrued in 30 years.
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The rules for the public sector v:ere changed in 1993-1994 but the old rules still
fully apply for all civil servants who were over the age of 55 in 1995 and partly
for those who were between 36 and 54 in 1995.
ln the private sector and for younger civil servants, a full 60% pension accrues
already by the age of 6'l for employees with no career breaks. Correspondingly,
a S5-year-old civil seruant may already have accrued a full pension according to
the old rules in the public sector. As a consequence, a voluntary early retire-
ment pension would result in a lower general retirement age. ln the private
sector, the general retirement age would be 61-62 years and in the public sector
55 years in the beginning and 56-57 years later. ln addition a voluntary early re-
tirement pension would wreck the 1993-1994 reform to gradually raise the gen-
eral retirement age in the public sector from 63 to 65 years.
Accrued pension promised at normal retirement age
One of the basic principles of the Finnish pension scheme is that an unreduced
old age pension is not granted until retirement age, even if a full pension has
accrued earlier. There is a huge difference in pension costs between granting a
pension at a set retirement age and granting a pension at an earlier age. The
early old age pension, where a pension taken earlier is actuarially reduced, very
well illustrates the difference between these two concepts. When reducing a
pension actuarially, the pension capital expected to be needed for a pension
granted at relirement age is first fixed by taking the expectation of life and the
discount rate into account. To put it simply, after this an actuarially reduced
pension is determined on the fixed pension capital. ln other words, an actuari-
ally reduced pension is cost neutral with respect to the pension granted at re-
tirement age (in reality, also the probability of forced early retirement is taken
into account).
A pension based on the pension accrued and granted before retirement age is
actually a huge advantage. lf the proposed pension of the same level as the
corresponding old age pension were granted at age 60, it would be about 30-
40% higher than an actuarially reduced pension, Correspondingly, a voluntary
early retirement pension granted at age 55 would be about 60% higher than a
cost-neutral pension.
tn practice the early old age pension benefit would disappear
A voluntary early retirement pension would, in practice, cause the early old age
pension benefit to disappear. A voluntary early retirement pension granted at
age 60 would be 30-40% higher than the corresponding early old age pension,
in practice with no additional conditions attached. ln principle, the early old age
pension may also be awarded after working careers shorter than 30 years, but
because of the actuarial reduction a pension ol 45"h level would decrease to a
good 30% and few retirees would live on so lovr an income. The voluntary early
retirement pension would be much more expensive than the early old age pen-
sion and it would cause pension costs to increase permanently.
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The costs for the pension scheme and for social security at large
Another problem of the Finnish pension scheme besides the low actual retire-
ment age has been the high cost of pensions. So, in the 1996 pension reform
pension benefits were cut. The reform brought a balance between pension con-
tributions and pension expenditure both in the short term and in the long term.
However, this balance would be disturbed if the proposed pensions were to re-
duce the unemployment rate considerably. The higher the pension costs, the
more marked the reduction in the unemployment rate.
Approximately 60-70% of employees over 55 have a 3O-year-long working ca-
reer after the age of 23. According to a survey (Gould, 1994), as high a propor-
tion as 60% of employed in age bracket 55-64 would prefer retirement to em-
ployment, if given the free choice. Because the suggested voluntary pension
benefit would be lower than the corresponding disability or unemployment pen-
sion benefit, it is not likely that it would be nearly as popular, considering that
employees of this age may exit work using the unemployment pension pathway.
The popularity of the voluntary early retirement pension proposed is impossible
to predict. Calculations are, therefore, based on assumptions. lt is assumed that
the pension benefit proposed would not affect the probability of other early re-
tirement pensions. Further, if one in ten of those qualifying for the suggested
pension would take it, 10,000 to 17,000 people would shift into retirement annu-
ally, which sums up to a total of nearly 100,000 people over a period of seven
years. This is around one-fourth compared to the amount of unemployed peo-
ple. During the first 7 years, pension costs would increase, then slowly de-
crease and after yet another 7 years some savings would be generated. During
the first 10 years, the pension contribution in per cent of wages would rise on
average by one percentage point. As a whole, future pension expenditure would
represent 4-5o/o of the current GDP, while savings in other social security costs,
such as in the cost of unemployment benefits, would be in the region of half this
amount. The net coming cost for such an arrangement would therefore be a
good 2o/" of the current GDP. Further, increasing labour costs tend to increase
unemployment.
6. Conclusions
The primary means of improving the economic situation of today are those cre-
ating new jobs. The proposals to reduce the unemployment rate for younger
people by lowering the pension age temporarily do not create any new jobs.
The result would only be seemingly lower unemployment rates and, at best, a
change of persons in already existing jobs, while elderly employed people
would exit the labour market permanently.
Large-scale unemployment may turn into an aggravating social problem, espe-
cially if the unemployment rate remains high. Therefore, the aim of the sugges-
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tions, i.e. to give young people jobs, is well worth supporting. Calculations,
however, show that financial aspects do not support the suggestions.
The pensions proposed are in conflict with the trends in both pension and un-
employment policy. ln terms of both pension and unemployment policy, the
aims are to give people an incentive to continue working and to encourage re-
tirees and unemployed people to return to gainful employment. The suggested
pension could be destructive for the whole pension scheme, as it strengthens
people's belief in the justification in taking early retirement. ln addition, the ac-
tual general retirement age would fall and conflict with other pension benefits.
The voluntary new pension would question the justification in projecting pen-
sions to retirement age. Furthermore, an actuarially unreduced pension granted
before the general retirement age would, as such, be a noticeable benefit.
The aim of pension policy is to maintain a balance between pension contribu-
tions and pension expenditure both in the short term and in the long term. To
this effect, pension benefits were recently cut. However, quite opposite to these
aims, the better the pension proposed would serve in terms of creating more
employment opportunities, the higher the rise in the pension contribution would
be. lf every tenth entitled to the benefit would take early retirement during the
validity of the proposal, the rate of pension contribution would, on average, rise
by one percentage point.
The statutory earnings-related pension scheme is based on insurance princi-
ples. Using such a scheme to satisfy needs of income transfers based on social
policy assistance is problematic and weakens the credibility of the scheme.
From the insurance point of view it is highly questionable that pension assets
are to be directed to healthy people, who are fit for work, shifting over from em-
ployment to retirement before the general retirement age.
Provision of eamings-related pensions in Finland is based on joint responsibility
between generations. The credibility and sustainability of the scheme requires
that agreements and decisions are not changed to achieve short-sighted targets
that are in contradiction with the aims of the pension policy pursued. Admittedly,
unemployment continues to be a pressing problem in Finland, but it should be
dealt with by means other than pension policy.
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Appendix 1
The Finnish statutory earnings-related pension scheme
The object of the Finnish statutory earnings-related pension scheme is to pro-
vide statutory pensions based on service in the private or public sector or on
self-employment, and to keep the income in retirement on a reasonable level
compared to the income during employment. The amount of pension depends
both on previous earnings and on the length of the insurance period. Benefits
are determined in the same way as under a defined-benefit scheme. ln addition,
the pension is index-linked both when earned and after retirement.
The private sector employee pension scheme was introduced in the early years
of the 1960s, the first targeted old age pensions will be granted at the tum of the
century, but not until the 2030s will the pension scheme attain maturity in re-
spect of pension financing. This means that the pension contribution is ex-
pected to rise gradually untilthe 2030s.
The pension benefits cover the social risk situations arising from old age, dis-
ability, long-term unemployment for elderly and the death of the family bread-
winner. The rules of pension accrual and pension benefits are presented in the
following.
Statutory earnings-related pension accrues in age bracket 23-64 and the target,
or maximum, amount of pension represents 60% of the wage. As a rule, pen-
sion accrues at an annual rate of 1.5Y" of pensionable earnings. However, for
those employed people over the age of 60, the annual accrual rates were raised
from 1.5% to 2.5"/" in the 1994 pension reform and the annual accrual rates for
the part of pension calculated on the post-contingency period were lowered
from 1.5% to 1.2"/" in age bracket 50-59 and from 1.5% to 0.8% in age bracket
60-64 in the 1996 pension reform.
ln the public sector, the target of the statutory earnings-related pension used to
be 66% of the wage and it accrued in 30 years. The general retirement age was
63 years. The rules were changed in 1993-1994 but the old rules stillfully apply
for all civil servants who were over 55 in 1995 and partially for those who were
between 36 and 54 in 1995.
The general retirement age is 65 years. ln the private sector, the pension is in-
creased by one per cent for each month of deferral beyond the age of 65, with
no upper limit.
Early old age pension may be awarded from the age of 60, but the pension is
permanently reduced by 0.5% for each month the pension is taken before the
age of 65.
Unemployment pension may be awarded from the age of 60 to job-seekers who
have been out of work for a prolonged period (of at least two years) but who
have been employed for at least 5 of the past 15 years.
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Disability pension may be awarded to an insured person of at least 14 years of
age who has suffered loss of work capacity through illness, defect or injury and
whose incapacity is estimated to last for at least one year. A full disability pen-
sion becomes payable when at least two{ifths of work capacity is lost and a
partial disability pension when between two-fifths and three-fifths of work ca-
pacity is lost. The partial disability pension is half the full pension. An individual
early retirement pension may be awarded to a person with a long working ca-
reer on less severe criteria of disability but with consideration of social factors.
The minimum qualifying age is now 58 years but used to be 55 years.
Part{ime pension may be awarded from the age of 58 to employees with long
working careers who switch over from fulltime to part{ime employment. As of
July 1998, the qualifying age will be fudher lowered to 56 years. This is an ex-
periment and it will last for 2 years.
Survivors' pension is payable to the children and suliving spouse of the de-
ceased.
Farmers' early retirement aid is payable to farmers between ages 55 and 64
who give up farming permanently.
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